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Abstract: In the recent years, Heterogeneous Distributed Networks (HDNs) is a
predominant technology implemented to enable various application in different fields
like transportation, medicine, war zone, etc. Due to its arbitrary self-organizing
nature and temporary topologies in the spatial-temporal region, distributed systems
are vulnerable with a few security issues and demands high security countermeasures.
Unlike other static networks, the unique characteristics of HDNs demands cutting
edge security policies. Numerous cryptographic techniques have been proposed by
different researchers to address the security issues in HDNs. These techniques utilize
too many resources, resulting in higher network overheads. This being classified
under light weight security scheme, the Trust Management System (TMS) tends to
be one of the most promising technology, featured with more efficiency in terms of
availability, scalability and simplicity. It advocates both the node level validation and
data level verification enhancing trust between the attributes. Further, it thwarts
a wide range of security attacks by incorporating various statistical techniques and
integrated security services. In this paper, we present a literature survey on different
TMS that highlights reliable techniques adapted across the entire HDNs. We then
comprehensively study the existing distributed trust computations and benchmark
them in accordance to their effectiveness. Further, performance analysis is applied
on the existing computation techniques and the benchmarked outcome delivered by
Recommendation Trust Computations (RTC) is discussed. A Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC) curve illustrates better accuracy for Recommendation Trust
Computations (RTC), in comparison with Direct Trust Computations (DTC) and
Hybrid Trust Computations (HTC). Finally, we propose the future directions for
research and highlight reliable techniques to build an efficient TMS in HDNs.
Keywords: direct trust computations, hybrid trust computations (HTC), heteroge-
neous distributed networks (HDNs), receiver operating characteristics, recommenda-
tion trust computations (RTC).
1 Introduction
Heterogeneous Distributed Networks have become increasingly popular in the recent years,
expanding its contribution across different computing fields with promising results. In wireless
networks, the nodes are equipped with On Board Units (OBU) that creates a dynamic commu-
nication between different agents without the need for any network infra-structure. Based on
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the user demands and network behavior, the HDNs can be classified into Mobile Ad-Hoc Net-
work (MANET), Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) and Wireless Sensor Network (WSN),
featured with unique characteristics to serve a particular environment. Many researchers have
rendered incredible contribution in all these domains and have developed standards and proto-
cols to serve the domain [3, 13]. Certain vital operations like sensing [16], routing [14, 17, 23]
and event monitoring [22] are some of the major research topics carried out by the researchers,
rendering prodigious contributions and problem-solving techniques in every domain.
Nowadays, the networks are loaded with built-in reliable standards and protocols, despite
this the security and privacy concerns are still some of the major issues [15], degrading the
efficiency and reliability of the application. Owing to the openness of the wireless network and
uncontrollability of the nodes without a Central Authority (CA), the availability of compromising
nodes and unauthorized access becomes inevitable in the network. Many researchers have worked
on this issue and proposed various schemes that can be broadly classified as hard and soft
security schemes [29,30]. In the hard security scheme, cryptographic algorithms are implemented
to ensure confidentiality on information exchange and authentication of participation nodes.
It demands more resource utilization to perform these actions and consumes more power and
processing capabilities that are scarcely available in these networks. Moreover, the reputation
of the participating nodes and the trustworthiness of the received message cannot be verified
using these schemes/techniques. Therefore, establishing a behavior analysis on these nodes and
the verification and validation of the message exchange is implemented using the soft security
scheme called Trust Management Systems (TMS). Using trust systems, the behavior analysis is
performed for the participating nodes and the selfish acts are reported by computing the trust
metrics.
In general, attributes like trustworthiness, reputation, belief and confidence impose uncertain
behavior in HDNs. Imprecise information floating around HDNs is unavoidable due to their
limitations in wireless communications [8]. HDNs demands an efficient technique to calibrate
the opinions and recommendations derived from direct and indirect communications. For this
purpose, trust computation (TC) is an important element in TMS, which will enable to compute
a trust metric between the trustor and trustee with the available information. Computing and
verifying the trust metric in unsupervised environment is challenging and demands an efficient
technique to handle it. Also during trust computations, the probability level of acceptance rate
in trust metric will change periodically due to the spatial-temporal factors. The probability levels
on trustworthiness can be estimated dynamically by monitoring the risk factors involved. Risk
analysis (RA) [11] is an important framework to measure trust metric in HDN and will be used
to adjust the acceptance rate of the trust metric based on the current requirement as shown in
Figure 1. Many technologies have been evolved for RA which primarily focuses on data driven
and node driven risk analysis. Decision making in HDNs is adapted to refine the obtained trust
metric using aggregated information. Due to the presence of uncertainty and imprecisions in the
trust computation logic, a reliable aggregation technique will help the requestor to estimate a
reliable trust metric of the enquiring node.
Implementing TMS for a fixed network is simple and direct, easily computing the trustwor-
thiness of a participating node. But, establishing a TMS in HDNs is highly challenging due to
the uncertain behavior in the environment. The following key points are some of the major issues
in establishing TMS in distributed networks.
• The spatial and temporal dimensions of the participating nodes are ever changing in the
dynamic networks making the node observation more challenging. Decisions made from
interactions may further provide futile results as the location and time cannot be referenced
in the environment which may increase the selfish behavior [10].
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Figure 1: A general view on trust supported models
• As every network follows a particular mobility model [25], handshaking between nodes
increases overhead due to the limitations in wireless network.
• Also the network does not follow a master-slave relationship, hence the decision making
on a recommendation message from a neighbor node necessitates further verification to
strengthen the result. It also limits the trust chain to be intact which cannot be forwarded
further.
In the recent years, TMS has contributed numerous models for the HDN and enormous con-
tributions from researchers has led to the development of an efficient model. However, a detailed
survey and benchmarking of these models is required for the entire HDN. Some researchers have
published survey papers on TMS which highlights the trust computing techniques only for a
particular network domain [9, 33]. Also, benchmarking the existing techniques and comparing
the techniques for an effective study, is still a major shortfall in these survey papers.
Therefore, a cohesive survey is still in high demand for the entire distributed networks to un-
derstand the accomplishment of the existing TMS models and requires benchmarking techniques
to explore the best models for the entire domain of HDN. In this paper, we have made a thorough
survey on TMS on a broader spectrum, highlighting the best practicing techniques in every HDN
domain. Further, the existing techniques are tested with statistical models and the effectiveness
is measured. The outcome of the performance measure presented in the paper highlights the
best techniques for TMS which addresses the security and privacy issues effectively. Also, the
paper conclusively recommends future research trends for a holistic TMS in HDN.
2 Trust dimensions
Trust is a relationship between two or more agents demonstrating the belief with one another,
with more reliability and trustworthiness. In HDN, the agent can be a vehicle node, Road-Side
Unit (RSU), mobile node or sensor node. Trust relationships are formed between agents to
Benchmarking of Recommendation Trust Computation
for Trust/Trustworthiness Estimation in HDNs 615
compute the trust relationship between trusting agents and trusted agents. In this section, we
introduce the trust dimensions which help to understand the basic entities of trust.
2.1 Trust environments
A node can analyze the trust relationship and compute the trust metrics based on the network
environment in which the participant nodes exist. The trust computation in the environment
can be broadly classified as physical and virtual trust. In physical trust, the trust is established
between nodes based on direct interactions. In this environment, the trust evaluation is restricted
to single hop interaction; whereas, in the virtual trust a trust metric can be computed from
nodes which are connected by intermediate nodes. In this environment, the nodes are virtually
connected and share recommendations to derive a trust metric.
2.2 Trust definition in literature
The importance of trust is widely accepted and acknowledged across different arenas in a
multifaceted vision and connotations. In the field of sociology, trust is referred to as a basic fact
of social life that involves both emotional and cognitive dimensions, sprouted from the past as
well as from the present activity. In Philosophy, trust is determined as plausible that concedes
to form relationships among people. It attributes to be an inevitable trait of our societal life
and determines our relationship with the environment, despite the fact that it always carries the
risk of being unwarranted. Likewise, in the Economics domain, trust can be conceptualized by
bounded rational and subjective probabilities. It make decisions on the business activities to
reduce the cost price and thereby discerned as an economic lubricant. In the field of Computer
Science and technology, trust is employed as a medium to provide a high-end security, privacy,
reliability and integrity in different computing group that ranges from network application to
internal system computations. In computing, trust is the firm vision and belief to authorize an
entity to act dependably secure and reliable within a specific context. It is to be kept in mind
that both the trustor and trustee should be validated equally to enhance the contextual factor
of expectancy.
2.3 Trust attributes
The three main properties of trust on a network are asymmetry, transitivity and composabil-
ity. Asymmetry trust is assured as two nodes trust each other on the same level. Transitivity
trust is an inferred trust. Composability trust, receives information from all available sources
and compose an opinion value.
2.4 Trust metrics
Trust evaluation metrics are classified into three categories: Trust on scale, trust by facets,
and trust upon logic. Trust on scale scheme measures the level of trust using discrete or con-
tinuous series. Trust through facets measure rely on three attributes; the belief, the disbelief
and uncertainty. The trust is represented as a triplet phase. Trust upon logic uses a probability
approach to determine the trust. The ratio upon the number of packets forwarded and received
is one trust measure.
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of trust computations
3 Trust computing approaches : an overview
As the HDNs is utilized by life-saving applications, the verification and validation of both
data and node is necessary to ensure the authenticity of the incoming data. Therefore, trust
management systems have an immense contribution in establishing the trustworthiness in the
self-organized HDN. TMS ensures the network to be safe from selfish and malicious nodes. In
order to enable trustworthiness between entities, measuring the trustworthy is an essential task.
With the uncertainties existing in the environment, the trustworthiness of a node or message has
to be ascertained. Additionally, a security system has to be in place to thwart any attacks and
to detect vulnerabilities. Adapting a reliable TMS model in HDN is the most effective way to
have a secure and reliable service in the environment. Enormous efforts using different statistical
and learning techniques have been built into TMS enabling seamless service.
Trust on a node can be ensured with subjective assessment on reliability and accuracy, as they
traverse along the node in a given context. Trust computations are measured upon experience,
recommendation and knowledge. The experience is measured at regular intervals in a trust table
using direct trust strategy. Recommendation on trust sets its path as the values in the trust
table are propagated to the other nodes. Knowledge of the total trust is evaluated based on the
previous trust computations. The strategies used to measure the trust at various situations differ
based on the environment and applicable mode of trust, the taxonomy is illustrated in Figure 2.
Based on the TMS schemes, trust computations are considered as an essential module to
verify and validate both node and data. In all the trust computation techniques, a trust metric
will be derived from the information shared by the peers. The reliability and credibility of the
trust metric is based on the completeness of the chosen factors that are taken into account. In
general, trust computations can be broadly classified into two categories based on the network
compatibility, (i) centralized trust computations and (ii) distributed trust computations.
In centralized trust computations, a Central Authority (CA) will manage the behavior of the
participating nodes and the trustworthiness is derived from the recommendations of CA. The
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TMS based on this scheme will follow a master-slave property and the scheme will provide a
reliable service to the nodes. However, there are limitations in these schemes, the entire system
access can be denied when the CA is under attack or compromised. Also, having centralized
servers in the distributed environment is not highly recommended as it could impact the dynam-
icity of the nodes. Summarizing, in order to have a reliable service in the HDN environment, the
node has to follow the peer-to-peer communication and has to be equally distributed in terms
of receiving, maintaining and distributing the trust metric. For this purpose, a distributed trust
computation offers a reliable service to the node and dynamically manages the trust metric in
the HDN environment.
In distributed trust schemes, the nodes are capable of managing themselves and the trust
metric is computed based on the input from the participating nodes alone. This paper discusses
only the schemes related to the distributed trusted models. Further, trust computation in the
distributed trust models follow three different strategies to compute the trust metric; (i) direct
trust, (ii) indirect trust and (iii) hybrid trust.
In direct trust computations (DTC), the trustworthiness of a node will be computed from the
direct experience. Based on the interactions with a single-hop node, the evidences are collected
and stored from the direct input relay node. When a node wants to participate in the network
for data exchange, a trust score for the node is computed from the direct interactions with the
trustee node and the experiences are shared from the single-hop nodes.
In indirect trust computations (ITC), the node trustworthiness will be computed from the
recommendations provided from the surrounding nodes. The nodes will constantly collect evi-
dence and monitor the neighboring nodes behavior. The opinions collected are based on the past
and present interaction with the node. If a trustee node wants to know about the trustworthiness
of a participating node, it can request other nodes to share their opinions and the other nodes
which have opinion on the participating node will share its information as recommendations
based on their previous experience. Using this information, the trustee node can compute the
trust metric for the participating node and can evaluate the nodes trustworthiness.
In hybrid trust computations (HTC), the results from DTC and ITC are utilized. The trust
metric is computed using both the direct experience and recommendations from surrounding
nodes are aggregated together. The basic idea in this scheme is to evaluate the trust metric
using direct experience and verify the same using the opinions obtained from the ITC. Using this
scheme, the selfish behavior nodes can be easily determined from the opinions provided by the
surrounding nodes.
The existing methodologies in distributed trust computations with maximum reliability and
efficiency are taken into consideration and a detailed comparison on different trust computations
are discussed in Table 1-3. In this tables, the selected schemes are evaluated based on the system
context, trust metrics, system merits, complexity and limitations of the system.
Based on the comparison, a brief discussion on the classifications of different networks with
incorporated trust schemes are highlighted in Table 4. Heterogeneous networks are incorporated
with different trust schemes to fulfill and improve the performance. The schemes are listed in
table 4 with a brief explanation provided for VANETs, MANETs and wireless sensor networks
(WSN). The schemes in Direct Trust Computations (DTC) category computes the trustwor-
thiness of a node based on its own experience, as well as on the opinions obtained from the
single-hop neighbor nodes.
Initially, every single node monitors the performance of other directly connected nodes and
maintains a precise information table pertaining to the success ratio of the message-forwarding
rate, message-strength, message-veracity and transaction rates. Subsequently, when a new target
node requests for a participation with a trustee node in the network, the trustee node probes an
opinion about the target node from its trustable single-hop neighbor nodes.
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Table 1: Direct trust computations
Direct (Experience) Trust Computations
Ref. Approach Context Trust
Met-
rics
Merits Complexity Limitations
[32]
Bayesian Ap-
proach
Packet for-
warding
based
Trust
met-
ric
[0,1]
*windowing
scheme is
used*trustworthy
route compu-
tation
* Route
Computation
* Opinion
Calculation
Vulnerable to
colluding and
badmouth at-
tack
[33]
Role and
Experience
Sensing
Cluster based
aggregation
Trust
value
[0,1]
*identity-
based ag-
gregation
*effective
local action
decision
*Cluster
Head compu-
tation
Non-
resistivity
to selfish
cluster-heads
[19]
A multi-
faceted trust
computing
approach
Roles, experi-
ence, priority,
and majority
opinion based
Trust
inter-
val
[-1,1]
*limits
consulting
advisors
*majority
consensus
*Computational
complexity
Vulnerable
to selfish
and spoofing
attacks
[20]
Bayesian
probabilistic
approach
Opinion ana-
lytics based
Trust
value
[0,1]
*beta and
Gaussian
reputation
system *ex-
pert Opinion
theory
*Computational
complexity
Vulnerable to
sybil attack
[6] Markov chain
approach
Trust value
based
Trust
value
[0,1]
*secure au-
thentication
for group
management
*Computational
complexity
Trust decay
factor not
considered
[28]
Recommen
-dation
exchange
approach
Neighbor
trust based
Trust
value
[0,1]
*resistance
to false *rec-
ommendation
attack
*Computational
complexity
Not suitable
for more com-
plex scenarios
[5] Perron-
Frobenius
(PF) theorem
Message be-
havior analy-
sis
Trust
value
[0,1]
*generate
trust values
full or partial
data
*Computational
complexity
Vulnerable
to On-Off
and Collusion
attack
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Table 2: Indirect trust computations
Indirect (recommendation) trust computations
Ref. Approach Context Trust
Met-
rics
Merits Complexity Limitations
[12]
Analytical
trust model
Node behav-
ior model
Trust
value
[0,1]
*Entity
and data
approach
with markov
chain *Re-
strict selfish
behavior
*Space
Complex-
ity *Com-
putation
Complexity
Demands
constant
monitoring
and updating
[7] Stochastic
Petri net
(SPN) tech-
nique
Trust chain
optimization
Trust
value
[0,1]
*precise trust
metric from
social and
QoS trust
*Computation
Complexity
Vulnerable to
selfish behav-
ior
[24]
Geographic
Hash Table
Consensus
technique
based
Trust
opin-
ion
[0,1]
*Identify
storage nodes
*Decrease
storage cost
*Computation
Complexity
Susceptible
to sophisti-
cated attacks
[18]
Dempster-
Shafer The-
ory(DST)
Attack resis-
tant model
Trust
value
[0,1]
*Trust eval-
uation for
both data
and node
*Space
Complex-
ity *Com-
putation
Complexity
Vulnerable to
sybil and col-
lusion attacks
[21]
Dempster-
Shafer theory
(DST)
Trust path
model
belief
map
[0,1]
*Detection
of malicious
nodes and
benign nodes
*Computation
Complexity
Demands
constant
monitoring
and updating
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Table 3: Hybrid trust computations
Hybrid Trust Computations
Ref. Approach Context Trust
Met-
rics
Merits Complexity Limitations
[1] Geometric
mean-based
Node trust
model
Trust
met-
ric
[0,1]
*Estimate
node trust
level *Reli-
able routing
*Computation
Complexity
Requires
constant
monitoring
and updating
[2] Stochastic
Petri nets
technique
Subjective
trust Valida-
tion
Trust
value
[0,1]
*Resilient
to black-
/sink hole,
slandering
and bad-
mouthing
attacks
*Space
Complex-
ity *Com-
putation
Complexity
System over-
head and
Cluster head
failure
[4] Dempster-
Shafer theory
(DST)
User centric
privacy based
Trust
value
[0,1]
*Estimate
trust event
messages
*Computation
Complexity
Vulnerable to
selfish behav-
ior
[26]
Bayesian
statistical
approach
Dynamic
cluster based
Trust
value
[0,1]
*Filter
dishonest
recommenda-
tions
*Computation
Complexity
Non-
resistance
to time and
location
dependent
attacks
[27]
Fuzzy logic
and graph
theory
Node trust
model
Trust
value
[0,1]
*Filtering
algorithm for
node *Decay
method for
routing
*Computation
Complexity
Vulnerable to
trust based
attacks
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Table 4: Trust in heterogeneous distributed networks
Heterogeneous distributed networks
Trust schemes VANET MANET WSN
Trust agent based
scheme
*Effective decision
making using agents
on routing
*Manage reputation
score for agents
*Estimate node trust
level using agents
and provides reliable
routing
Hybrid trust scheme *Estimate trust
event messages
*Helps to extricate
malicious and selfish
nodes *Detect inside
attackers
*Distinguish trust
nodes Decay method
for routing
*Identify malicious
sensor data
Recommendation
trust scheme
*Enhance trustwor-
thiness estimation
*Detect fraudulent
servers
*Precise trust metric
from social and QoS
trust
*Resistance to false
attacks on sensor
nodes
Direct trust scheme *Generate trust val-
ues with full or par-
tial data
*Secure authentica-
tion for group man-
agement
*Behavior analysis of
nodes and computes
trust score
The neighbor nodes which has previous experience with the target node, share its opinion
about the target node. After collecting the opinions, the trustee node computes the trust metric
for the target node and evaluates its trustworthiness.
In order to serve this purpose, techniques like Bayesian approach, Markov chain modelling
and Perron-Frobenius (PF) models are employed in computing the trust metric in DTC. As
the trustworthiness are computed only from the direct nodes, the derived trust metric is in-
stantaneous and may not be accurate. Additionally, due to the limitations like mobility and
connectivity issues that already exists in the HDN environment, the communication between
two nodes are short lived and the opinions obtained from the neighbor nodes will be significantly
minimal. These lead the trust metric in DTC provide a futile and biased results.
The Recommendation Trust Computations (RTC) category utilizes techniques and computes
the trust value from the recommendations relayed from various indirect nodes. Every node follows
a transitive path to derive the trustworthiness of other nodes. In order to find the trustworthiness
of a target node, the trustee node broadcasts a message to the neighboring nodes, requesting
an opinion about the target node. The nodes holding previous handshaking experience with the
target node will share their opinions to the trustee node in a multi-hop fashion. Once the trustee
node receives the opinions, it validates the received data based on the signal strength, distance,
time lapse, similarity, energy level and closeness of the node. For this purpose, techniques like
Dempster-Shafer theory (DST), Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) and Geographic Hash Tables are
employed to verify the opinions and compute the trust metric for the target node. Due to fact
that the recommendations are obtained from unknown and indirect nodes, the recommendations
exhibit selfishness that are too hard to identify and validate. Moreover, attacks like Sybil and
On-Off attacks would easily compromise the network and malicious nodes remain undetectable
due to the indirect connections.
Consequently, in such above mentioned cases, the Hybrid Trust Computations (HTC) can be
employed as a reliable technique that involves both the functionalities of direct and recommenda-
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Figure 3: Taxonomy of trust computations
tion trust computation schemes. Along the lines of HTC technique, the trustee node computes
the trustworthiness of a target node, procures opinions from the neighbor node without any
limitations. Both direct referrals and indirect recommendations are utilized to derive the trust
metric for the target node. Using this technique, the trustworthiness of both data and node
could be verified.
Generally, the trustee node combines the recommendations from indirect vehicles and ag-
gregates it to a single opinion. This aggregated metric will be further validated by the direct
referrals that are in close proximity to the trustee node. In this technique, the derived trust
metric for the target node is verified and validated by both the direct and the indirect nodes.
Thereby, this multifaceted computation strategy efficiently computes and validates the trust
metric, providing more resistance to the selfish behavior and thwarts the trust related attacks in
the HDN environment.
4 Estimation of trust computations
Trust is computed based on two varieties of trust between the trustor and trustee nodes.
They are direct trust and recommendation trust. In direct trust, the trust value is authenticated
by a directed path between the trustor and the trustee. Whereas, in recommendation trust,
the trust value is authenticated by third parties. In hybrid computation, both directed path
trust value and third party recommended trust values are considered and the trust computation
models are shown in Figure 3.
4.1 Direct trust computation (DTC)
Direct-trust computations are estimated with trust values ranging between +1 and -1. A
tangent-hyperbolic function is used to estimate the trust value (a) built on the experience of
trustor node (b), as shown in Equation (1). The equation is generalized, as a trustor node en-
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Table 5: Trust elements and their properties
Element Property
Pi Path directed trust value
Wi Prioritizes the level of importance on trust
τ i Node directed trust value; +1 for positive experience; -1 for negative experience
N Unlimited, varies with environment
Ri Recommended trust value range between +1 and -1
counters many trustee nodes and affect the evaluation of trust. The trust value will be computed
using Equation (2), where Pi represents the direct-path experience with ith trustee node, n is the
total number of trustee nodes that participate with the trustor node, Wi represents the weight
for the directed path prioritizing the experience and τ i is +1 for a positive trust with the ith
trustee node and -1 for distrust. The trust element properties are listed in Table 5.
a =
sinh(b)
cosh(b)
= tanh(b) (1)
TDTC = tanh(
n∑
i=1
τi × PiWi) (2)
The reason behind the choice of tangent hyperbolic function in comparison to the other iden-
tity activation function and logistic sigmoidal function being, the identity function maps output
values range between −∞ to∞, logistic sigmoidal function maps output range lies between 0 and
1, whereas tangent hyperbolic function maps output values range from −1 to 1. Summarizing
these, the trust values calculated in DTC use hyperbolic tangent function, to return trust values
between −1 and +1. The corresponding hyperbolic tangents values ratio over hyperbolic sine
represented as sinh() function and hyperbolic cosine represented as cosh() function.
4.2 Recommendation trust computation (RTC)
The trustor node has no directed path of experience with the trustee, therefore, it enquires a
third node otherwise called the recommender node. When nodes do not encounter directed path
experiences, they rely on third party recommendations. In this situation, to justify reasonable
recommendation, the trustor always initiates multiple recommendation path experiences. The
path experiences are not limited. The recommended trust values depend on the trustworthiness
of the third party nodes with the trustor itself. Multiple trust recommendations from multiple
third party nodes to the trustor widens the vision of the trustor in fixing the trust value for the
trustee.
TR =
n∑
i=1
(Ri × TDTCi) (3)
The recommender node when enquired delivers a trust value Ri on the ith trustee node.
The trustor holds TDTC the direct trust value for the recommender node, as shown in Equa-
tion (3). The recommender nodes trust values reasonability is crosschecked by the trustor by
inquiring/investigating several third party recommendation nodes.
624 H. El-Sayed, S. Sankar, H. Yu, G. Thandavarayan
Table 6: Trust computation (TC) summary
Trustee-id Trustor-id Wi Pi τ i TC (Expected) Actual
DTC RTC HTC Trust
166497924 725979012 4 1 1 0.999329 0.999329 0.999329 +1
166497924 258110 5 1 1 0.999909 0.999909 0.999909 +1
166497924 334400 5 1 1 0.999909 0.999909 0.999909 +1
166497924 492685 4 1 1 0.999329 0.999329 0.999329 +1
166497924 396581 4 1 1 0.999329 0.999329 0.999329 +1
166497924 328049 4 0.5 -1 0.995055 -0.99505 -0.59703 -1
166497924 534929 4 1 -1 0.995055 -0.99505 -0.59703 -1
166497924 768446340 4 1 -1 0.999329 -0.99933 -0.59960 -1
166497924 223418 3 0.5 -1 0.964028 -0.96403 -0.57842 -1
166563460 379568 5 1 1 0.999909 0.999909 0.999909 +1
4.3 Hybrid trust computation (HTC)
The trustor acquires direct trust values and recommendation trust values for the trustee node.
The equations (3) and (2) are combined together in Equation (4) to arrive at hybrid computation
trust value TH . If TDTC value is high and TR value is low, then considerations on TDTC is more
when compared with TR, or vice versa.
TH = {TDTC = +}, (1× |TDTC |×TR)(−1 ≤ TDTC ≤ 1)(−1 ≤ TR ≤ 1) (4)
In particular instances, when TDTC = 1 and the trustor is assured complete certainty on
the trust value, then the trustor will no longer consider the third party nodes recommendations.
Otherwise, as TDTC = 0 and the trustor is not assured complete certainty on the trust value,
then the trustor will rely on the recommendations that are relayed from the third party nodes.
In addition, the consideration of recommendations trust depends on the percentage of certainty
values of direct trust.
5 Empirical results
The dataset from www.trustlet.org is explored and the trust values are computed using
all the three computation strategies DTC, RTC, and HTC which are listed in Table 6. The
expected/actual trust values are computed and plotted for visual illustration as shown in Figure
4.
6 Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) benchmarking trust
computations
The operating characteristics are classified for the actual and estimated trust values with
true positive (TP), true negative (TN) along with false positive (FP) and false negative (FN)
accordingly in Table 7. The dataset from www.trustlet.org is being used to plot the ROC
for 1000 instances, with equally distributed trust and distrust values (500 instances each). The
characteristic of true positive denotes the proportion of trusted trust values correctly classified as
+1, true negative is the proportion of distrust trust values correctly classified as -1, false positive
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Figure 4: Trust computation summary (Direct, Recommendation, and Hybrid)
Table 7: Actual vs Estimated trust values
Actual Trust value Estimated Trust value
1 / -1 Trust Distrust Trust Distrust
Trust TP FP TP FN
Distrust FN TN FP TN
shows the proportion of distrust trust values incorrectly classified as +1 and false negative as
the proportion of trusted trust values incorrectly as -1.
The sensitivity or true positive rate (TPR) on trust values are calculated by dividing the true
positive values by the summed up value of true positive and false negative. Later, specificity or
true negative rate (TNR) on trust values are calculated by dividing the true negative values by the
summed up value of true negative and false positive. The estimations on true positive/negative
and false positive/negative for expected and actual trust/distrust values as shown in Figure 5(a)
moving ahead further graph is plotted on sensitivity and specificity as shown in Figure 5(b). The
values estimated for sensitivity and specificity are presented in table 8.
The true positive rates will be plotted along the Y axis and false positive rates will be plotted
along the X axis. Hence, an ROC is defined by TRP and FPR. The ROC curve shown in Figure
6, illustrates no false negatives and no false positives on the left upper coordinate (0, 1).
A probability threshold has been used to classify the trust/distrust values. The values are
classified based on probability. When the probability shoots the threshold it gets into class
1 (trust) and as it becomes low, class 0 (distrust). The group discrimination can also point
some errors in certain cases. A ROC graph is constructed for all the three trust computation
techniques described above. The computations are done for many varying thresholds. The ROC
curve in Figure 6 showcases the area under curve (AUC) for all DTC, RTC and HTC. The graph
with the highest AUC portion is the best recommended trust computation model. Hence, RTC
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Figure 5: Benchmarking results
Figure 6: ROC Curve benchmarked on trust computations
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Table 8: ROC analysis (Sensitivity vs Specificity)
Trust/Distrust Sensitivity Low (95%) Up (95%) Specificity Low (95%) Up (95%)
-0.999 1.000 0.789 1.000 0.083 0.000 0.379
-0.995 1.000 0.789 1.000 0.250 0.085 0.540
-0.964 1.000 0.789 1.000 0.333 0.138 0.612
-0.600 1.000 0.789 1.000 0.417 0.194 0.681
-0.597 1.000 0.789 1.000 0.583 0.319 0.806
-0.578 1.000 0.789 1.000 0.667 0.388 0.862
0.964 1.000 0.789 1.000 0.750 0.460 0.915
0.995 1.000 0.789 1.000 0.917 0.621 1.000
0.999 0.500 0.291 0.709 1.000 0.713 1.000
1.000 0.167 0.052 0.402 1.000 0.713 1.000
is pronounced as the best recommended trust computation to be adopted for trust management
and is benchmarked with experimental results.
The complete ROC analysis is highlighted in Table 8, where the upper bound and lower
bound of the sensitivity, specificity are specified. The negative/positive trust values are mapped
towards both FPR and TPR. The upper/lower bounds ensure the trustworthiness for the received
trust values between the nodes.
7 Conclusion and future enhancements
In this research, we have quantified the trust metrics between nodes in heterogeneous dis-
tributed network. We have defined three possible distributed trust computation strategies, we
make an effort to zero-in on the best one and describe its performance by substantiating with
highly accurate trustworthiness. The nodes in HDNs demonstrate trustworthiness among the
participating nodes using DTC, RTC or HTC. The trust evaluation is performed and trust met-
rics are shared and recommended among the participating nodes. The trust values are measured
using discrete/continuous series. The dataset from www.trustlet.org when computed with DTC,
HTC and RTC delivers appropriate values for TP, TN, FP and FN. When the computed values
of TPR and FPR are plotted on a ROC, the AUC presents itself. The AUC (area under curve)
values are 0.938, 0.979 and 1.000 for DTC, HTC and RTC respectively. Interpreting the ROC
graph with respective AUC regions, we conclude that the Recommendation Trust Computation
(RTC) delivers a highly accurate trustworthiness score when compared with the other two trust
computations. Hence, the RTC techniques trust computation performance is benchmarked with
appropriate experimental results and we declare that RTC delivers promising trustworthiness
and is more reliable over DTC and HTC. In future, we plan to extend recommendation trust
computation (RTC) in VANETs to eliminate malicious entries and secure the vehicular network
appropriately. The next step is to extend our research further ahead to include more efficient
and dynamic approaches for trust computing, ensuring a high degree of trustworthiness.
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